The Project Gutenberg eBook of Index of the Project Gutenberg Works of Immanuel Kant

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Title: Index of the Project Gutenberg Works of Immanuel Kant

Author: Immanuel Kant

Editor: David Widger

Release date: March 6, 2019 [eBook #59023]
Most recently updated: April 6, 2023

Language: English

Credits: Produced by David Widger

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK INDEX OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG WORKS OF IMMANUEL KANT *** 




 





      INDEX OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG

 WORKS OF

 IMMANUEL KANT
    




 





      Compiled by David Widger
    




 





KANT





 





 





      CONTENTS
    



      Click on the  ##  before each of the titles to view a
      linked
 table of contents for that volume.
    



      Click on the title itself to open the original online file.
    






##   THE
          CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON
 
 ## 
 THE
          CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 
 
 ## 
 FUNDAMENTAL
          PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 
 
 ##   THE
          METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS 
 
 ## 
 THE
          INJUSTICE OF COUNTERFEITING BOOKS 
 
 ## 
 CRITIQUE
          OF JUDGEMENT 
 
 ## 
 PERPETUAL
          PEACE 
 
 ## 
 
          PROLEGOMENA 
 









 






 








 





      TABLES OF CONTENTS OF VOLUMES
    




 








 










      THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON
    



      By Immanuel Kant
    



      Translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn
    










      CONTENTS
    







Preface to the First Edition (1781)







Preface to the Second Edition (1787)







Introduction 







          I. Of the difference between Pure and Empirical Knowledge 







          II. The Human Intellect, even in an Unphilosophical State, is in
          Possession of Certain Cognitions "a priori". 







          III. Philosophy stands in need of a Science which shall Determine the
          Possibility, Principles, and Extent of Human Knowledge "a priori" 







          IV. Of the Difference Between Analytical and Synthetical Judgements.
          







          V. In all Theoretical Sciences of Reason, Synthetical Judgements "a
          priori" are contained as Principles. 







          VI. The Universal Problem of Pure Reason. 







          VII. Idea and Division of a Particular Science, under the Name of a
          Critique of Pure Reason. 

















I. Transcendental Doctrine of Elements







          First Part—TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC 







          § 1. Introductory 







          SECTION I. OF SPACE 







          § 2. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception. 







          § 3. Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Space. 







          § 4. Conclusions from the foregoing Conceptions. 







          SECTION II. OF TIME 







          § 5. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception. 







          § 6. Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Time. 







          § 7. Conclusions from the above Conceptions. 







          § 8. Elucidation. 







          § 9. General Remarks on Transcendental Aesthetic. 







          § 10. Conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic. 







          Second Part—TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC 







          Introduction. Idea of a Transcendental Logic 







          I. Of Logic in General 







          II. Of Transcendental Logic 







          III. Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic







          IV. Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Transcendental
          Analytic and Dialectic 







          FIRST DIVISION—TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC 







          BOOK I. Analytic of Conceptions. § 2







          Chapter I. Of the Transcendental Clue to the Discovery of all Pure
          Conceptions of the Understanding 







          Introductory § 3







          Section I. Of the Logical Use of the Understanding in General. § 4







          Section II. Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in
          Judgements. § 5







          Section III. Of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding, or
          Categories. § 6







          Chapter II. Of the Deduction of the Pure Conception of the
          Understanding







          Section I. Of the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction in general
          § 9







          Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. § 10







          Section II Transcendental Deduction of the pure Conceptions of the
          Understanding.







          Of the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold representations
          given by Sense. § 11.







          Of the Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception. § 12







          The Principle of the Synthetical Unity of Apperception is the highest
          Principle of all exercise of the Understanding. § 13







          What Objective Unity of Self-consciousness is. § 14







          The Logical Form of all Judgements consists in the Objective Unity of
          Apperception of the Conceptions contained therein. § 15







          All Sensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories, as Conditions
          under which alone the manifold Content of them can be united in one
          Consciousness. § 16







          Observation. § 17







          In Cognition, its Application to Objects of Experience is the only
          legitimate use of the Category. § 18







          Of the Application of the Categories to Objects of the Senses in
          general. § 20







          Transcendental Deduction of the universally possible employment in
          experience of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding. § 22







          Result of this Deduction of the Conceptions of the Understanding. § 23







          BOOK II. Analytic of Principles 







          INTRODUCTION. Of the Transcendental Faculty of judgement in General.







          TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE FACULTY OF JUDGEMENT OR, ANALYTIC OF
          PRINCIPLES.







          Chapter I. Of the Schematism at of the Pure Conceptions of the
          Understanding.







          Chapter II. System of all Principles of the Pure Understanding.







          Section I. Of the Supreme Principle of all Analytical Judgements.







          Section II. Of the Supreme Principle of all Synthetical Judgements.







          Section III. Systematic Representation of all Synthetical Principles
          of the Pure Understanding.







          Chapter III Of the Ground of the Division of all Objects into
          Phenomena and Noumena.







          APPENDIX.







          SECOND DIVISION—TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC 







          TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. INTRODUCTION. 







          I. Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance.







          II. Of Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusory Appearance.







          TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC—BOOK I—OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF PURE
          REASON.







          Section I-Of Ideas in General.







          Section II. Of Transcendental Ideas.







          Section III. System of Transcendental Ideas.







          TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC—BOOK II—OF THE DIALECTICAL
          PROCEDURE OF PURE REASON.







          Chapter I. Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason.







          Chapter II. The Antinomy of Pure Reason.







          Section I. System of Cosmological Ideas.







          Section II. Antithetic of Pure Reason.







          Section III. Of the Interest of Reason in these Self-contradictions.







          Section IV. Of the necessity imposed upon Pure Reason of presenting a
          Solution of its Transcendental Problems.







          Section V. Sceptical Exposition of the Cosmological Problems presented
          in the four Transcendental Ideas.







          Section VI. Transcendental Idealism as the Key to theSolution of Pure
          Cosmological Dialectic.







          Section VII. Critical Solution of the Cosmological Problem.







          Section VIII. Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in relation to the
          Cosmological Ideas.







          Section IX. Of the Empirical Use of the Regulative Principle of Reason
          with regard to the Cosmological Ideas.







          I. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the
          Composition of Phenomena in the Universe.







          II. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Division
          of a Whole given in Intuition.







          III. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the
          Deduction of Cosmical Events from their Causes.







          IV. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the
          Dependence of Phenomenal Existences.







          Chapter III. The Ideal of Pure Reason.







          Section I. Of the Ideal in General.







          Section II. Of the Transcendental Ideal (Prototypon Trancendentale).







          Section III. Of the Arguments employed by Speculative Reason in Proof
          of the Existence of a Supreme Being.







          Section IV. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the
          Existence of God.







          Section V. Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the
          Existence of God.







          Section VI. Of the Impossibility of a Physico-Theological Proof.







          Section VII. Critique of all Theology based upon Speculative
          Principles of Reason.







          Appendix. Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason.

















II. Transcendental Doctrine of Method







          Chapter I. The Discipline of Pure Reason.







          Section I. The Discipline of Pure Reason in the Sphere of Dogmatism.







          Section II. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics.







          Section III. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Hypothesis.







          Section IV. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Relation to Proofs.







          Chapter II. The Canon of Pure Reason.







          Section I. Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason.







          Section II. Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Determining Ground
          of the Ultimate End of Pure Reason.







          Section III. Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief.







          Chapter III. The Architectonic of Pure Reason.







          Chapter IV. The History of Pure Reason.








 








 










      THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON
    



      By Immanuel Kant
    



      1788
    



      Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott
    




 





      CONTENTS
    







          PREFACE. 







          INTRODUCTION. 







          Of the Idea of a Critique of Practical Reason. 







FIRST PART — ELEMENTS OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON. 







BOOK I. The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason. 







          CHAPTER I. Of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason. 







          I. DEFINITION. 







          REMARK. 







          II. THEOREM I. 







          III. THEOREM II. 







          REMARK I. 







          REMARK II. 







          IV. THEOREM II. 







          REMARK. 







          V. PROBLEM I. 







          REMARK. 







          VII. FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE PURE PRACTICAL REASON. 







          REMARK. 







          COROLLARY. 







          REMARK. 







          VIII. THEOREM IV. 







          REMARK. 







          REMARK II. 







          Practical Material Principles of Determination taken as the Foundation
          of Morality, are: 















          I. Of the Deduction of the Fundamental Principles of Pure 







          II. Of the Right that Pure Reason in its Practical use has to an
          Extension which is not possible to it in its Speculative Use. 







          CHAPTER II. Of the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason. 







          Table of the Categories of Freedom relatively to the Notions of Good
          







          Of the Typic of the Pure Practical Judgement. 







          CHAPTER III. Of the Motives of Pure Practical Reason. 







          Critical Examination of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason. 







BOOK II. Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason. 







          CHAPTER I. Of a Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason Generally. 







          CHAPTER II. Of the Dialectic of Pure Reason in defining the Conception
          of the "Summum Bonum". 







          I. The Antinomy of Practical Reason. 







          II. Critical Solution of the Antinomy of Practical Reason. 







          III. Of the Primacy of Pure Practical Reason in its Union with the
          Speculative Reason. 







          IV. The Immortality of the Soul as a Postulate of Pure Practical
          Reason. 







          V. The Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason. 







          VI. Of the Postulates of Pure Practical Reason Generally. 







          VII. How is it possible to conceive an Extension of Pure Reason in a
          Practical point of view, without its Knowledge as Speculative being
          enlarged at the same time? 







          VIII. Of Belief from a Requirement of Pure Reason. 







          IX. Of the Wise Adaptation of Man's Cognitive Faculties to his
          Practical Destination. 







SECOND PART. -- METHODOLOGY OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON. 







          Methodology of Pure Practical Reason. 







          CONCLUSION. 








 








 










      FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
    



      By Immanuel Kant
    



      1785
    



      Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott
    









      CONTENTS
    







          PREFACE 







          FIRST SECTION—TRANSITION FROM THE COMMON RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE OF
          MORALITY TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL 







          SECOND SECTION—TRANSITION FROM POPULAR MORAL PHILOSOPHY TO THE
          METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 







          The Autonomy of the Will as the Supreme Principle of Morality 







          Heteronomy of the Will as the Source of all spurious Principles of
          Morality 







          Classification of all Principles of Morality which can be founded on
          the Conception of Heteronomy 







          THIRD SECTION—TRANSITION FROM THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS TO THE
          CRITIQUE OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON 







          The Concept of Freedom is the Key that explains the Autonomy of the
          Will 







          Freedom must be presupposed as a Property of the Will of all Rational
          Beings 







          Of the Interest attaching to the Ideas of Morality 







          How is a Categorical Imperative Possible? 







          Of the Extreme Limits of all Practical Philosophy. 







          CONCLUDING REMARK 








 








 










      THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS
    



      By Immanuel Kant
    



      1780
    



      Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott
    









      CONTENTS
    







          PREFACE 







INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS 







          I. Exposition of the Conception of Ethics 







          II. Exposition of the Notion of an End which is also a Duty 







          REMARK 







          III. Of the Reason for conceiving an End which is also a Duty 







          IV. What are the Ends which are also Duties? 







          V. Explanation of these two Notions 







          A. OUR OWN PERFECTION 







          B. HAPPINESS OF OTHERS 







          VI. Ethics does not supply Laws for Actions (which is done by
          Jurisprudence), but only for the Maxims of Action 







          VII. Ethical Duties are of indeterminate, Juridical Duties of strict,
          Obligation 







          VIII. Exposition of the Duties of Virtue as Intermediate Duties 







          (1) OUR OWN PERFECTION as an end which is also a duty 







          (2) HAPPINESS OF OTHERS as an end which is also a duty 







          IX. What is a Duty of Virtue? 







          X. The Supreme Principle of Jurisprudence was Analytical; that of
          Ethics is Synthetical 







          XI. According to the preceding Principles, the Scheme of Duties of
          Virtue may be thus exhibited 







          XII. Preliminary Notions of the Susceptibility of the Mind for Notions
          of Duty generally 







          A. THE MORAL FEELING 







          B. OF CONSCIENCE 







          C. OF LOVE TO MEN 







          XIII. General Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals in the treatment
          of Pure Ethics 







          XIV. Of Virtue in General 







          XV. Of the Principle on which Ethics is separated from Jurisprudence
          







          REMARKS 







          Of the Doctrine of Virtue on the Principle Of Internal Freedom. 







          XVI. Virtue requires, first of all, Command over Oneself 







          XVII. Virtue necessarily presupposes Apathy (considered as Strength)
          







          REMARK 







ON CONSCIENCE 








 








 










      OF THE INJUSTICE OF COUNTERFEITING BOOKS
    



      By Immanuel Kant
    




 





      CONTENTS
    







          OF THE INJUSTICE OF COUNTERFEITING BOOKS 







          I. Deduction of the Editor's Right against the Counterfeiter 







          Proof of the Major 







          Proof of the Minor 







          II. Refutation of the Counterfeiter's pretended Right against the
          Editor. 







          Proof of the Major 







          Proof of the Minor 







          Universal Observation 








 








 










      KANT'S CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT
    



      Translated With Introduction And Notes
 By J. H. Bernard, D.D., D.C.L.
      Bishop Of Ossory
    



      CONTENTS
    






Editor's Introduction


xi






Preface


1






Introduction


7






I.


          Of the division of Philosophy
        

7






II.


          Of the realm of Philosophy in general
        

11






III.


          Of the Critique of Judgement as a means of combining the two parts of
          Philosophy into a whole
        

14






IV.


          Of Judgement as a faculty legislating a priori


17






V.


          The principle of the formal purposiveness of nature is a
          transcendental principle of Judgement
        

20






VI.


          Of the combination of the feeling of pleasure with the concept of the
          purposiveness of nature
        

27






VII.


          Of the aesthetical representation of the purposiveness of nature
        

30






VIII.


          Of the logical representation of the purposiveness of nature
        

35






IX.


          Of the connexion of the legislation of Understanding with that of
          Reason by means of the Judgement
        

39






First Part.—Critique
          of the Aesthetical Judgement


43






First Division.—Analytic of the Aesthetical Judgement
        

45






First Book.—Analytic of the Beautiful
        

45






First Moment of the judgement of taste, according to quality
        

45






          § ?1.
        

          The judgement of taste is aesthetical
        

45






          § ?2.
        

          The satisfaction which determines the judgement of taste is
          disinterested
        

46






          § ?3.
        

          The satisfaction in the pleasant is bound up with interest
        

48






          § ?4.
        

          The satisfaction in the good is bound up with interest
        

50






          § ?5.
        

          Comparison of the three specifically different kinds of satisfaction
        

53vi






Second Moment of the judgement of taste, viz. according to
          quantity
        

55






          § ?6.
        

          The Beautiful is that which apart from concepts is represented as the
          object of a universal satisfaction
        

55






          § ?7.
        

          Comparison of the Beautiful with the Pleasant and the Good by means of
          the above characteristic
        

57






          § ?8.
        

          The universality of the satisfaction is represented in a judgement of
          Taste only as subjective
        

59






          § ?9.
        

          Investigation of the question whether in a judgement of taste the
          feeling of pleasure precedes or follows the judging of the object
        

63






Third Moment of judgements of taste according to the relation
          of the purposes which are brought into consideration therein
        

67






          § 10.
        

          Of purposiveness in general
        

67






          § 11.
        

          The judgement of taste has nothing at its basis but the form of the
          purposiveness of an object (or of its mode of representation)
        

69






          § 12.
        

          The judgement of taste rests on a priori grounds
        

70






          § 13.
        

          The pure judgement of taste is independent of charm and emotion
        

72






          § 14.
        

          Elucidation by means of examples
        

73






          § 15.
        

          The judgement of taste is quite independent of the concept of
          perfection
        

77






          § 16.
        

          The judgement of taste, by which an object is declared to be beautiful
          under the condition of a definite concept, is not pure
        

81






          § 17.
        

          Of the Ideal of Beauty
        

84






Fourth Moment of the judgement of taste, according to the
          modality of the satisfaction in the object
        

91






          § 18.
        

          What the modality in a judgement of taste is
        

91






          § 19.
        

          The subjective necessity which we ascribe to the judgement of taste is
          conditioned
        

92






          § 20.
        

          The condition of necessity which a judgement of taste asserts is the
          Idea of a common sense
        

92






          § 21.
        

          Have we ground for presupposing a common sense?
        

93






          § 22.
        

          The necessity of the universal agreement that is thought in a
          judgement of taste is a subjective necessity, which is represented as
          objective under the presupposition of a common sense
        

94






General remark on the first section of the Analytic
        

96vii






Second Book.—Analytic of the Sublime
        

101






          § 23.
        

          Transition from the faculty which judges of the Beautiful to that
          which judges of the Sublime
        

101






          § 24.
        

          Of the divisions of an investigation into the feeling of the Sublime
        

105






          A.—Of the Mathematically Sublime
        

106






          § 25.
        

          Explanation of the term "Sublime"
        

106






          § 26.
        

          Of that estimation of the magnitude of natural things which is
          requisite for the Idea of the Sublime
        

110






          § 27.
        

          Of the quality of the satisfaction in our judgements upon the Sublime
        

119






          B.—Of the Dynamically Sublime in Nature
        

123






          § 28.
        

          Of Nature regarded as Might
        

123






          § 29.
        

          Of the modality of the judgement upon the sublime in nature
        

130






General remark upon the exposition of the aesthetical
          reflective Judgement
        

132






Deduction of [pure] aesthetical judgements
        

150






          § 30.
        

          The Deduction of aesthetical judgements on the objects of nature must
          not be directed to what we call Sublime in nature, but only to the
          Beautiful
        

150






          § 31.
        

          Of the method of deduction of judgements of taste
        

152






          § 32.
        

          First peculiarity of the judgement of taste
        

154






          § 33.
        

          Second peculiarity of the judgement of taste
        

157






          § 34.
        

          There is no objective principle of taste possible
        

159






          § 35.
        

          The principle of Taste is the subjective principle of Judgement in
          general
        

161






          § 36.
        

          Of the problem of a Deduction of judgements of Taste
        

162






          § 37.
        

          What is properly asserted a priori of an object in a judgement
          of taste
        

164






          § 38.
        

          Deduction of judgements of taste
        

165






          § 39.
        

          Of the communicability of a sensation
        

167






          § 40.
        

          Of taste as a kind of sensus communis


169






          § 41.
        

          Of the empirical interest in the Beautiful
        

173






          § 42.
        

          Of the intellectual interest in the Beautiful
        

176






          § 43.
        

          Of Art in general
        

183






          § 44.
        

          Of beautiful Art
        

185






          § 45.
        

          Beautiful art is an art in so far as it seems like nature
        

187






          § 46.
        

          Beautiful art is the art of genius
        

188






          § 47.
        

          Elucidation and confirmation of the above explanation of Genius
        

190viii






          § 48.
        

          Of the relation of Genius to Taste
        

193






          § 49.
        

          Of the faculties of the mind that constitute Genius
        

197






          § 50.
        

          Of the combination of Taste with Genius in the products of beautiful
          Art
        

205






          § 51.
        

          Of the division of the beautiful arts
        

206






          § 52.
        

          Of the combination of beautiful arts in one and the same product
        

214






          § 53.
        

          Comparison of the respective aesthetical worth of the beautiful arts
        

215






          § 54.
        

          Remark
        

220






Second Division.—Dialectic of the Aesthetical Judgement
        

229






          § 55.
        

           
        

229






          § 56.
        

          Representation of the antinomy of Taste
        

230






          § 57.
        

          Solution of the antinomy of Taste
        

231






          § 58.
        

          Of the Idealism of the purposiveness of both Nature and Art as the
          unique principle of the aesthetical Judgement
        

241






          § 59.
        

          Of Beauty as the symbol of Morality
        

248






          § 60.
        

Appendix:—Of the method of Taste
        

253






Second Part.—Critique
          of the Teleological Judgement


257






          § 61.
        

          Of the objective purposiveness of Nature
        

259






First Division.—Analytic of the Teleological Judgement
        

262






          § 62.
        

          Of the objective purposiveness which is merely formal as distinguished
          from that which is material
        

262






          § 63.
        

          Of the relative, as distinguished from the inner, purposiveness of
          nature
        

268






          § 64.
        

          Of the peculiar character of things as natural purposes
        

272






          § 65.
        

          Things regarded as natural purposes are organised beings
        

275






          § 66.
        

          Of the principle of judging of internal purposiveness in organised
          beings
        

280






          § 67.
        

          Of the principle of the teleological judging of nature in general as a
          system of purposes
        

282






          § 68.
        

          Of the principle of Teleology as internal principle of natural science
        

287






Second Division.—Dialectic of the Teleological Judgement
        

292ix






          § 69.
        

          What is an antinomy of the Judgement?
        

292






          § 70.
        

          Representation of this antinomy
        

293






          § 71.
        

          Preliminary to the solution of the above antinomy
        

296






          § 72.
        

          Of the different systems which deal with the purposiveness of Nature
        

298






          § 73.
        

          None of the above systems give what they pretend
        

302






          § 74.
        

          The reason that we cannot treat the concept of a Technic of nature
          dogmatically is the fact that a natural purpose is inexplicable
        

306






          § 75.
        

          The concept of an objective purposiveness of nature is a critical
          principle of Reason for the reflective Judgement
        

309






          § 76.
        

          Remark
        

313






          § 77.
        

          Of the peculiarity of the human Understanding, by means of which the
          concept of a natural purpose is possible
        

319






          § 78.
        

          Of the union of the principle of the universal mechanism of matter
          with the teleological principle in the Technic of nature
        

326






Appendix.—Methodology of the Teleological Judgement
        

334






          § 79.
        

          Whether Teleology must be treated as if it belonged to the doctrine of
          nature
        

334






          § 80.
        

          Of the necessary subordination of the mechanical to the teleological
          principle in the explanation of a thing as a natural purpose
        

336






          § 81.
        

          Of the association of mechanism with the teleological principle in the
          explanation of a natural purpose as a natural product
        

342






          § 82.
        

          Of the teleological system in the external relations of organised
          beings
        

346






          § 83.
        

          Of the ultimate purpose of nature as a teleological system
        

352






          § 84.
        

          Of the final purpose of the existence of a world, i.e. of
          creation itself
        

359






          § 85.
        

          Of Physico-theology
        

362






          § 86.
        

          Of Ethico-theology
        

370x






          § 87.
        

          Of the moral proof of the Being of God
        

377






          § 88.
        

          Limitation of the validity of the moral proof
        

384






          § 89.
        

          Of the use of the moral argument
        

392






          § 90.
        

          Of the kind of belief in a teleological proof of the Being of God
        

395






          § 91.
        

          Of the kind of belief produced by a practical faith
        

403






General remark on Teleology
        

414








 








 










      PERPETUAL PEACE, A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY
    



      By Immanuel Kant
    



      1795
    



      Translated With Introduction And Notes By M. Campbell Smith
    



      CONTENTS
    






PAGE






          PREFACE BY PROFESSOR LATTA
        

v






          TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION
        

1






          PERPETUAL PEACE
        

106






          FIRST SECTION CONTAINING THE PRELIMINARY ARTICLES OF PERPETUAL PEACE
          BETWEEN STATES
        

107






          SECOND SECTION CONTAINING THE DEFINITIVE ARTICLES OF PERPETUAL PEACE
          BETWEEN STATES
        

117






          FIRST SUPPLEMENT CONCERNING THE GUARANTEE OF PERPETUAL PEACE
        

143






          SECOND SUPPLEMENT-A SECRET ARTICLE FOR PERPETUAL PEACE
        

158






          APPENDIX I.-ON THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN MORALS AND POLITICS WITH
          REFERENCE TO PERPETUAL PEACE
        

161






          APPENDIX II.-CONCERNING THE HARMONY OF POLITICS WITH MORALS ACCORDING
          TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEA OF PUBLIC RIGHT
        

184






          INDEX
        

197








 








 










      PROLEGOMENA
    



      By Kant
    



      Edited In English By Dr. Paul Carus
    



      CONTENTS
    






PUBLISHERS' PREFACE.






INTRODUCTION.






PROLEGOMENA.






          PREAMBLE ON THE PECULIARITIES OF ALL METAPHYSICAL COGNITION.
        





FIRST PART OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM.






          HOW IS PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE?
        





SECOND PART OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM.






          HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE?
        





THIRD PART OF THE MAIN TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM.






          HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE?
        





SCHOLIA.






          SOLUTION OF THE GENERAL QUESTION OF THE PROLEGOMENA, "HOW IS
          METAPHYSICS POSSIBLE AS A SCIENCE?"
        





APPENDIX.